Signaling game

Results: 128



#Item
21Lewis Signaling Games | Directive/Assertion Distinction | A New Game  Answering Answering the the intentionality intentionality challenge

Lewis Signaling Games | Directive/Assertion Distinction | A New Game Answering Answering the the intentionality intentionality challenge

Add to Reading List

Source URL: www.andrew.cmu.edu

Language: English - Date: 2015-10-22 14:27:44
    22Bayesian Persuasion Emir Kamenica and Matthew Gentzkow∗ University of Chicago SeptemberAbstract

    Bayesian Persuasion Emir Kamenica and Matthew Gentzkow∗ University of Chicago SeptemberAbstract

    Add to Reading List

    Source URL: www.najecon.org

    Language: English - Date: 2011-01-27 15:15:19
    23Lewis Signaling Games | Directive/Assertion Distinction | A New Game  The Evolution of Directives and Assertions Kevin J.S. Zollman  Carnegie Mellon University

    Lewis Signaling Games | Directive/Assertion Distinction | A New Game The Evolution of Directives and Assertions Kevin J.S. Zollman Carnegie Mellon University

    Add to Reading List

    Source URL: www.andrew.cmu.edu

    Language: English - Date: 2015-10-22 14:27:47
      24Muddled Information∗ Alex Frankel† Navin Kartik‡  December 3, 2014

      Muddled Information∗ Alex Frankel† Navin Kartik‡ December 3, 2014

      Add to Reading List

      Source URL: innovation-archives.berkeley.edu

      Language: English - Date: 2015-02-10 14:57:54
      25Paper to be presented at the DRUID 2011 on INNOVATION, STRATEGY, and STRUCTURE Organizations, Institutions, Systems and Regions at Copenhagen Business School, Denmark, June 15-17, 2011

      Paper to be presented at the DRUID 2011 on INNOVATION, STRATEGY, and STRUCTURE Organizations, Institutions, Systems and Regions at Copenhagen Business School, Denmark, June 15-17, 2011

      Add to Reading List

      Source URL: druid8.sit.aau.dk

      Language: English - Date: 2011-05-31 11:20:43
      26Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure∗ Jeanne Hagenbach† Fr´ed´eric Koessler‡

      Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure∗ Jeanne Hagenbach† Fr´ed´eric Koessler‡

      Add to Reading List

      Source URL: www2.warwick.ac.uk

      Language: English - Date: 2014-03-12 21:34:04
      271  Curriculum Vitae Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau Contact Information Department of Economics, Rutgers University

      1 Curriculum Vitae Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau Contact Information Department of Economics, Rutgers University

      Add to Reading List

      Source URL: econweb.rutgers.edu

      Language: English - Date: 2015-06-17 06:53:57
      28MA300.2 Game Theory II, LSE Lecture 10: Sequential Games with Imperfect Information 1. The Spence Signaling Model Or: a model of education in which you don’t really learn anythingBut that’s not why this model

      MA300.2 Game Theory II, LSE Lecture 10: Sequential Games with Imperfect Information 1. The Spence Signaling Model Or: a model of education in which you don’t really learn anythingBut that’s not why this model

      Add to Reading List

      Source URL: www.econ.nyu.edu

      Language: English - Date: 2005-03-12 04:19:21
      29Between cheap and costly signals: the evolution of partially honest communication rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org  Kevin J. S. Zollman1, Carl T. Bergstrom2,3 and Simon M. Huttegger4

      Between cheap and costly signals: the evolution of partially honest communication rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org Kevin J. S. Zollman1, Carl T. Bergstrom2,3 and Simon M. Huttegger4

      Add to Reading List

      Source URL: www.andrew.cmu.edu

      Language: English - Date: 2014-12-10 11:49:54
      30Conversations About Type: Privacy, Grammars and Taboos Ned Augenblick and Aaron Bodoh-Creed Abstract We provide a model in which two strategic agents exchange verifiable information

      Conversations About Type: Privacy, Grammars and Taboos Ned Augenblick and Aaron Bodoh-Creed Abstract We provide a model in which two strategic agents exchange verifiable information

      Add to Reading List

      Source URL: faculty.haas.berkeley.edu

      Language: English - Date: 2013-08-19 13:41:14